Sir Alexander Cadogan and the Steward-Hesse Affair: Assessments of British Cabinet Politics and Future British Policy, 1938

Abstract

Neville Chamberlain’s practice of appeasement reached its peak during the aftermath of the Munich conference. In October and November, he tried through several channels to influence Adolf Hitler to follow up on the prospect of Anglo-German understanding that Chamberlain thought underpinned the Anglo-German declaration signed at Munich on 30 September 1938. As part of this process, an unofficial emissary, George Steward, Chamberlain’s Press Secretary, met with Fritz Hesse, the Head of the Dienstelle Ribbentrop and the Nachrichtenbüro in the German Embassy in London. The Security Service, MI5, learned of this approach and informed the Foreign Office. Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Undersecretary of State at the Foreign Office wrote a memorandum discussing the pros and cons of telling Viscount Halifax about Steward’s activity. Cadogan feared that Chamberlain was responsible for Steward’s actions and that the Prime minister’s interference in the business of the Foreign Office could provoke Viscount Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, to resign, potentially splitting the government and leading to a general election. The memorandum, largely overlooked in the literature, showed a senior civil servant’s assessment of British foreign policy and Cabinet politics and discussed possible directions for future British policy. Cadogan’s discussion foreshadowed the future turn in British policy emphasizing resistance and establishing tighter conditions on future appeasement of Nazi Germany.