Single till V. Dual till and the Paradox of Airport Competition

Abstract

Airports’ regulatory till has been an issue of debate between airlines and airports for some time now. In 1most of the cases the type of till is set by legislation or it is part of concession agreements under which many airports operate now in Europe. As claimed by airlines and airlines associations the use of the single till, under which non aeronautical revenues are taken also into account when considering the level of airport charges, it rightfully reflects the indispensable link between aeronautical and nonaeronautical services provided at an airport, while the use of either the dual till concept where only aeronautical revenues are taken into account for setting airport charges or of the hybrid till mechanism under which only part of the non-aeronautical revenues are considered, is an evidence of lack of competition among airports and of misuse of their market power. Airports on the other hand indicate that the full costs of aeronautical charges and therefore the principle of cost relatedness is ensured under the dual till concept and the choice of regulatory till cannot be related to the competitiveness of the airport market or with abusive conduct. Recent evaluation assessments however carried out by the European Commission does not seem to accept as sufficient evidence of misuse of market power of airports the use of dual till, while airports have long before been subjected to the competition rules.