Singer's moral principles and rules

Abstract

IN HIS book Generalization in Ethics' Professor Marcus Singer presents the generalization argument as the cornerstone of a moral system. There are difficulties with his "deduction" of the generalization argument; however, I shall not concern myself with them. My purpose is to show that even granted the generalization argument Singer's moral system is not satisfactory and would require considerable modification to be acceptable. Singer conceives of a moral system as made up of principles and rules. Moral rules can have exceptions, can conflict with one another, and may not be relevant to a particular moral action. Moral principles do not allow exceptions, are always relevant, and do not conflict with one another. The generalization argument fits in in two ways. (1) It may be viewed as a principle and as such is one of the principles of Singer's system. (2) All moral rules are justified by the generalization argument (p. 119). I contend that if the generalization argument is taken as a moral principle it conflicts with one of Singer's other principles, and, hence, he cannot meet his own criterion that moral principles do not conflict. Also, the type of moral rules Singer wants in his system have properties of two quite different sorts of which only one kind may be established by the generalization argument. First it is helpful to briefly review the generalization argument. The generalization argument states: "If the consequences of everyone's doing x would be undesirable, then no one ought to do x" (p. 66). However, four qualifications need to be made upon it or its application. First, the argument has restricted universality. "Everyone" does not refer to every possible person but only to everyone of similar nature and circumstances. Second, the argument must be understood to have what might be called a dependence clause. The conclusion should read "no one ought to do x without a justification" rather than just "no one ought to do x." Third, the argument is invertible when the consequences of everyone's and of no one's doing x are equally undesirable. When invertible the argument does not apply as it would obviously bring about a conflict. Fourth, the argument does not apply if it is reiterable. This occurs when it is applied to some particular action, i.e., one that is specified "as taking place at some particular time, or at some particular place, or by some particular person, or in relation to some particular person orthing" (p.81). Singer claims that "a little reflection suffices to show that it is impossible