Abstract
I examine the welfare properties of free entry under conditions of simultaneous entry. Specifically, I consider the second-best problem of influencing the number of entrants while taking as given firm behavior upon entry. I consider two alternative models of simultaneous entry: grab-the-dollar entry and war-of-attrition entry. I show that, if entry costs are low, then the results from previous models of sequential entry are fairly robust to the possibility of simultaneous entry. If however entry costs are high, then the welfare effects of free entry depend delicately on the nature of the entry game being played.
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