Simulation, theory, and content

Abstract

Introduction Some, the theory-theorists, say that when we make judgements about the psychological states of others and use such judgements to predict or explain we employ some theory about the psychological. But others, the simulationists, say that we possess no such theory, or at least none complete enough to underpin all our competence with psychological notions; rather, they say, what we do in such situations is simulate others' mental states and processes in ourselves and thus get insight into what others are likely to do. My aim in this paper is first to offer an argument in favour of simulationism but second to suggest possible limits to the simulationist strategy. I shall suggest that simulation must be central as far as dealing with the contents of others' mental states is concerned but is much less clearly of relevance in dealing with non-content. Thus philosophers and psychologists should not oppose simulation to theory, but should rather ask what is the appropriate realm of each and how they interact. The topic throughout is the nature of the fully developed adult competence with psychological notions, in the context of predicting others' future psychological states and actions on the basis of knowledge about their current psychological states. I shall not discuss the (it seems to me) importantly different question of how we arrive at judgements about other's thoughts, feelings etc. from knowledge of placement in the environment or bodily behaviour.