Simulation of the Implementation of the Single Transferable Vote in Bosnia and Herzegovina – the Case of Elections for the Parliamentary Assembly in 2000

Abstract

The electoral system is deeply divided and post-conflict societies have a prominent place in the existing literature studying political and institutional regulation. One of the assumptions is that the electoral system encourages political actors to act and behave more moderately or radically. Proportional representation electoral systems are widespread and are generally considered the most suitable for the representation of social groups, although the success of their outcomes remains disputable. Two types of proportional systems – party lists and single transferable vote – stand mutually opposed from the standpoints of incentives of political actors to political moderation. The party lists system (list-PR) was criticized for encouraging more radical behavior as opposed to the single transferable vote (STV) which instigated more moderate behavior. The outcomes of the named two types of proportional systems will be compared based on the case study of the elections for the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina which were held in 2000, using counterfactual simulation. Contrary to the expected outcomes of the STV, the electoral simulation will show that the list-PR has proven to be a more successful institutional solution in terms of encouraging political moderation. A STV would not significantly lead to an interethnic exchange of preferences, nor the representation of the small moderate parties, contrary to the list-PR that enabled their representation.