Simulating an employer of last resort program for Argentina (2003–2015)

Abstract

The employer of last resort (ELR) is a policy proposal designed as an alternative to using unemployment as the primary mean to control the value of the currency. This paper complements the analysis at the theoretical level and provides an estimate of the potential economic effects of an ELR program on the Argentine economy. According to the simulations within the historical economic cycle, the ELR (1) would permanently eliminate involuntary unemployment, (2) by setting an effective minimum wage equal to the poverty line, it would eradicate poverty—at least that originating in insufficient labor income—, (3) if combined with a quantity rule for non-ELR public spending, the policy could influence the size of the program and, thus, attempt to offset the acceleration (or deceleration) of inflation with respect to the target. In addition, the ELR would prevent the so-called “external constraint” from implying (as it currently does) involuntary unemployment (and poverty). In a sense, and as the simulated scenarios pretend to illustrate, an ELR would, at least, replace the tradeoff between the “two evils” (unemployment and inflation) by another between inflation and the proportion of ELR employment.