Abstract
We analyze the design of regulatory policy in the presence of demand uncertainty when the regulated firm has superior knowledge of its cost structure. The presence of demand uncertainty introduces important new considerations for the regulator. We show that by limiting the regulated firm's obligation to serve and by protecting the firm against stranded investment, the regulator can enhance consumer welfare relative to the case where the regulator can only set a single price for the regulated product before demand is realized.
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