Abstract

Abstract This chapter identifies how the tragic loss of life in the space shuttle accidents in 1987 and 2003 as well as the two deadly crashes of 737 MAXes in 2018 could occur despite very high levels of expertise and professionalism both in NASA and Boeing. The chapter argues that corporate cultures may lead to disastrous moral consequences when people—who do not desire to do harm—work as a group. The chapter identifies two phenomena that are particularly to blame: silo mentalities and dominant logics. The former concerns the tendency to overspecialization within large organizations, sometimes resulting in an almost deliberate ignorance of problems for which detection requires a broader awareness. The latter concerns an overriding cultural lens that can obscure what should be obvious. The chapter proposes remedies. First is the adoption of Adam Smith’s perspective of an “impartial spectator.” Awareness of cognitive framing and bounded awareness are vital steps toward attaining that perspective. Second, the chapter recommends communication, cross-disciplinary training, and improved risk and system analyses to counter any divide between engineers and the business side of an organization as well as any tendency for engineers to remain silent based on respect for superiors.

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