Silent Citizenship in Democratic Theory and Practice: The Problems and Power of Silence in Democracy

Abstract

Many theorists believe humans’ ability to speak gives them access to democratic life. I take up a neglected question: What does silence mean for democratic theory and practice? The answer usually given is that silence indicates a deficiency, a normative vacuum in which citizens are excluded from public life through a lack of opportunity, confidence, information, or articulateness. I depart from this view. Silence is more than negative – it can also communicate in ways that democratic theory should be attuned and democratic institutions might empower. Building on pragmatic accounts of language I develop a typology able to capture silence’s multiple meanings in democratic life: not only as a symptom of exclusion (which it often is), but also as a ubiquitous form of expression citizens use affect, demonstrate, regulate, and facilitate their interactions, non-verbally, for better or worse. I end by considering how this typology can help theorists rethink problems of coercion within two generic components of democratic decision-making: aggregation and representation. For those concerned by issues of inclusion, the typology helps determine when to empower speech and when to be receptive to silences. For those studying democratic institutions, such a typology shows us ways to mitigate exclusionary silences while empowering expressive ones.