Abstract
Changing attitudes of consumers shopping, online shopping has gradually become the mainstream. However, because of the characteristics of online shopping, there is information asymmetry in the process of trading, which makes it hard for customers to identify quality of online stores, causing a series of service failure. To solve this problem, this study regards the online store and customers as the game sides, and the level of service recovery as a signal, and establishes a signalling game model, under the three different relations of the two types of online store service failure probabilities, three Bayesian Equilibria of signal game is analyzed, and the only existence condition of the separating equilibrium is given respectively in three situation, and the countermeasures of online stores and customers in the case of information asymmetry are obtained.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
