Abstract
This article generalizes the model of Dodonova and Khoroshilov (2006 Dodonova, A and Khoroshilov, Y. 2006. Jump bidding in takeover auctions. Economics Letters, 92: 339–41. [Google Scholar]) who argues that there are no signalling equilibria in takeover auctions.
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