Abstract
In a repeated interaction, if the actions of an agent signal a private characteristic, or type, they will influence how he is expected to act in future, giving reputational incentives. If the signaler's type can change over time, these incentives can persist.A general model of repeated signaling is presented. The type space is finite or a continuum, and players have arbitrary supermodular payoffs. There is a unique equilibrium with continual (minimal) separation of types. It is selected by a recursive version of the equilibrium refinement D1. The equilibrium is calculable, showing a quantitative dependence of reputation on patience, the length of the game, and the random process on types.
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