Abstract
We present a model that shows that strong shareholder rights have a greater impact on value for firms that operate in less opaque information environments. We model shareholder rights as an option at the disposal of shareholders to stop projects chosen by a manager, and show that the value of this veto increases with the precision of a signal the shareholder receives about project type. The model has implications for design of regulatory policy aimed at strengthening shareholder rights.
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