Sign use and cognition in automated scientific discovery: are computers only special kinds of signs?

Abstract

James Fetzer criticizes the computational paradigm, prevailing in cognitive science by questioning, what he takes to be, its most elementary ingredient: that cognition is computation across representations. He argues that if cognition is taken to be a purposive, meaningful, algorithmic problem solving activity, then computers are incapable of cognition. Instead, they appear to be signs of a special kind, that can facilitate computation. He proposes the conception of minds as semiotic systems as an alternative paradigm for understanding mental phenomena, one that seems to overcome the difficulties of computationalism. Now, I argue, that with computer systems dealing with scientific discovery, the matter is not so simple as that. The alleged superiority of humans using signs to stand for something other over computers being merely “physical symbol systems” or “automatic formal systems” is only easy to establish in everyday life, but becomes far from obvious when scientific discovery is at stake. In science, as opposed to everyday life, the meaning of symbols is, apart from very low-level experimental investigations, defined implicitly by the way the symbols are used in explanatory theories or experimental laws relevant to the field, and in consequence, human and machine discoverers are much more on a par. Moreover, the great practical success of the genetic programming method and recent attempts to apply it to automatic generation of cognitive theories seem to show, that computer systems are capable of very efficient problem solving activity in science, which is neither purposive nor meaningful, nor algorithmic. This, I think, undermines Fetzer’s argument that computer systems are incapable of cognition because computation across representations is bound to be a purposive, meaningful, algorithmic problem solving activity.