Abstract
AbstractAs an ultra-lightweight block cipher, PRESENT is presented by A. Bogdanov et al. in CHES 2007. In this paper, we detect the non-random properties in the first four rounds of PRESENT based on cube attack proposed by Shamir et al. By analyzing the features of the S-box and pLayer, we give the side channel cube attack on PRESENT. If any output bit of the third round is leaked, we can recover the total 80-bit key. Especially, for the leaked bit 1, bit 2 or bit 3 of the output bits in the third round, we can also recover 80-bit key with lower computing complexity compared to other leaked bits, and our attack requires 215 chosen plaintexts and 232 31-round PRESENT encryptions.KeywordsCryptanalysisCube attackSide channel attackPRESENT
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