Showing the Path to Path Dependence

Abstract

This article investigates the conceptual and theoretical implications of the logic of habit for the path-dependence approach. In the existing literature, we see three different logics of action associated with three distinct models of path dependence: the logic of consequences (instrumental rationality) is linked with utilitarian paths (i.e. increasing returns); the logic of appropriateness (normative rationality) constitutes normative paths (normative lock-in) and the logic of arguing (communicative rationality) is connected to ideational/discursive paths (discursive lock-in). This study suggests that despite its popularity, the path-dependence approach remains underspecified due to its exclusion or neglect of the logic of habit, which constitutes a distinct mechanism of reproduction in the institutional world. Thus, this article introduces the notion of the ‘habitual path’ as a fourth model of path dependence. Although the idea of the habitual path is complementary with the existing models, due to its distinctive notions of agency and mechanisms of path reproduction, it offers a different interpretation of continuity or regularity. Thus, by enriching the path-dependence approach, the notion of the habitual path would contribute to our comprehension of continuities and discontinuities in the institutional world.