Abstract

The family of ghosts haunting the house of semantic and logical theory at least since Frege (i892), whose members include semantic presupposition, truth-value gaps, and multivalued logic, has not yet been exorcised.1 Nor have the best efforts of philosophers and linguists, working in tandem or at loggerheads, succeeded in determining just which members of the family are the black sheep. Noel Burton-Roberts has undertaken an ambitious programme to defend semantic presupposition against both its enemies (the 'anti-presuppositionalist lobby' of Wilson, Kempson, Atlas, Boer, Lycan, et al.) and its friends not to mention its godparents, Frege (i 892) and Strawson (I950). The points he seeks to establish in his comprehensive and closely (if not always convincingly) argued study include:

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