Abstract
This paper proposes a correction to the Flis-Słomczyński-Stolicki (2019, 2020) formula for countries with large variation among their districts in terms of political divisions. The Flis-Słomczyński-Stolicki formula (FSS formula) estimates seat allocations under the Jefferson-D’Hondt method by using national vote shares, as well as other parameters that are often readily available. However, the FSS formula does not yield precise estimates in those countries where there are independent candidates, special rights assigned to minority parties, signifi cant variation in district sizes, or an unequal distribution of votes due to ethnic or other regional divisions. Hence, I propose dividing the national distribution of votes into regions that satisfy the assumptions of the FSS formula within their district borders. By applying the FSS formula to regions consisting of historically and politically homogenous districts, I demonstrate that the formula’s estimates become signifi cantly more precise. For instance, by applying the regional correction to the 2018 Turkish Parliamentary elections, as well as other Turkish elections between 2007 and 2015, I show that the formula with the correction in three separate regions improves the Loosemore-Hanby goodness of fi t estimates from 2.1 to 3.41 percentage points (95% CI). Thus, the correction might signifi cantly improve the estimates of the FSS formula in various countries, including Spain, Peru, and Belgium.
Highlights
Introduction to the Turkish Electoral SystemThe current political system in Turkey is presidential
By applying the regional correction to the 2018 Turkish Parliamentary elections, as well as other Turkish elections between 2007 and 2015, I show that the formula with the correction in three separate regions improves the Loosemore-Hanby goodness of fit estimates from 2.1 to 3.41 percentage points
I first apply the formula to the election results by using only the national vote share without any regional corrections to show the discrepancy between the real results and the estimated results
Summary
We present a selection of articles by Uğurcan Evci and Marek M. The electoral districts are strongly differentiated in terms of political preferences of their inhabitants due to high ethnical heterogeneity of the country, and in particular to concentration of the Kurdish population in south-eastern Turkey which makes the support for the HDP, a party representing the Kurdish minority, very strong in some areas and almost non-existent in other ones This phenomenon results in limited applicability of the FSS formula (Flis, Słomczyński and Stolicki 2019, 2020) designed to estimate seat allocations under the Jefferson-D’Hondt method by using only the vote shares on the national level. Evci and Kamiński provide a striking example of counterproductive effects of electoral engineering They convincingly demonstrate that a change in the electoral law, i.e. introducing apparentement in the 2018 election by AKP, the ruling political party in Turkey, in fear that their coalitional partner would not meet the 10% threshold, resulted in losing the majority in the parliament which would have been comfortably retained under the old electoral law
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
