Abstract
Recently, many scientists have become concerned about an excessive number of failures to reproduce statistically significant effects. The situation has become dire enough that the situation has been named the ‘reproducibility crisis’. After reviewing the relevant literature to confirm the observation that scientists do indeed view replication as currently problematic, I explain in philosophical terms why the replication of empirical phenomena, such as statistically significant effects, is important for scientific progress. Following that explanation, I examine various diagnoses of the reproducibility crisis, and argue that for the majority of scientists the crisis is due, at least in part, to a form of publication bias. This conclusion sets the stage for an assessment of the view that evidential relations in science are inherently value-laden, a view championed by Heather Douglas and Kevin Elliott. I argue, in response to Douglas and Elliott, and as motivated by the meta-scientific resistance scientists harbour to a publication bias, that if we advocate the value-ladenness of science the result would be a deepening of the reproducibility crisis.
Highlights
In 2016, a “News Feature” in the journal Nature written by Monya Baker (2016a) describes the results of a survey of 1576 scientific researchers, drawn from a wide swath of disciplines, on the topic of the reproducibility of results published in scientific literature
A convergent, empirical observation is recorded by Daniele Fanelli who finds in a Web of Science search of the phrases ‘reproducibility crisis’, ‘scientific crisis’, ‘science in crisis’, ‘crisis in science’, ‘replication crisis’ and ‘replicability crisis’
I review the opinions of two particular philosophers who lead the way in endorsing the value-ladenness of science, Heather Douglas and Kevin Elliott, and argue that if their views were correct, the replication crisis would be exacerbated, and the progress of science stymied
Summary
In 2016, a “News Feature” in the journal Nature written by Monya Baker (2016a) describes the results of a survey of 1576 scientific researchers, drawn from a wide swath of disciplines, on the topic of the reproducibility of results published in scientific literature. I review the opinions of two particular philosophers who lead the way in endorsing the value-ladenness of science, Heather Douglas and Kevin Elliott, and argue that if their views were correct, the replication crisis would be exacerbated, and the progress of science stymied. I close the paper by considering the sort of policy initiatives Douglas and Elliott, as advocates of the valueladenness of science, would be prone to endorse, as opposed to alternative strategies that limit the influence of bias Considering how destructive these initiatives would be to good scientific methodology, it is clear that more measures need to be put in place to promote strategies that reduce bias and value-ladenness in science
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