Abstract

AbstractStephen Clark’s article The Rights of Wild Things from 1979 was the starting point for the consideration in the animal ethics literature of the so-called ‘predation problem’. Clark examines the response of David George Ritchie to Henry Stephens Salt, the first writer who has argued explicitly in favor of animal rights. Ritchie attempts to demonstrate—via reductio ad absurdum—that animals cannot have rights, because granting them rights would oblige us to protect prey animals against predators that wrongly violate their rights. This article navigates the reader through the debate sparked off by Clarke’s article, with as final destination what I consider to be the best way to deal with the predation problem. I will successively discuss arguments against the predation reductio from Singer’s utilitarian approach, Regan’s deontological approach, Nussbaum’s capability approach, and Donaldson and Kymlicka’s political theory of animal rights.

Highlights

  • Stephen Clark’s article The Rights of Wild Things from 1979 was the starting point for the consideration in the animal ethics literature of the so-called ‘predation problem’ (Dorado 2015, 234)

  • Clark examines the response of Scottish philosopher David George Ritchie (1853–1903) to Henry Stephens Salt (1851–1939), who is credited to be the first writer to have argued explicitly in favor of animal rights

  • This article navigates the reader through the debate sparked off by Clarke’s article, with as final destination what I consider to be the best way to deal with the predation problem

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Summary

Introduction

Stephen Clark’s article The Rights of Wild Things from 1979 was the starting point for the consideration in the animal ethics literature of the so-called ‘predation problem’ (Dorado 2015, 234). Clark examines the response of Scottish philosopher David George Ritchie (1853–1903) to Henry Stephens Salt (1851–1939), who is credited to be the first writer to have argued explicitly in favor of animal rights. Ritchie attempts to demonstrate—via reductio ad absurdum—that animals cannot. This chapter is a reprint from an article published in the Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics (2016) 29: 813–834

Keulartz (B)
Utilitarianism
Piecemeal Engineering
The Balance of Nature and the Argument from Ignorance
Paradise Engineering
Rights Theories
Lack of Moral Agency
Non-human Victims
The Capabilities Approach
The Other Species Capability
Broadening the Capabilities Approach
Political Theory of Animal Rights
Similarities and Dissimilarities with the Capabilities Approach
Competence and Risk
Positive and Negative Duties
The Limits of a Place-Based Approach
Blurring Boundaries
Learning to Hunt and to Avoid Predators
Findings
Concluding Remarks

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