Abstract
In this paper I draw on the fairy tale Cinderella to examine the distinction articulated in analytical jurisprudence between harm and injustice. I argue that the wrong done to Cinderella is an injustice, not a harm. While law is increasingly concerned with harms to children, it is persistently unconcerned with the injustices they suffer. This, I argue, is a mistake informed by a deeply gendered understanding of the distinction between the public and private realms. From Cinderella’s case, I turn to the US Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education and the settlement of the residential schools claims of Indigenous children in Canada to argue that the law ought not to take the view that injustice to children is not legally cognizable unless and until it can be conceptually transposed into harm. Injustice to children ought particularly to engage the law’s concern where (as in both school segregation in the US and the residential schools in Canada) state action is directly responsible for the injustice in question.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.