Abstract
Should I believe something if and only if it’s true? Many philosophers have objected to this kind of truth norm, on the grounds that it’s not the case that one ought to believe all the truths. For example, some truths are too complex to believe; others are too trivial to be worth believing. Philosophers who defend truth norms often respond to this problem by reformulating truth norms in ways that do not entail that one ought to believe all the truths. Many of these attempts at reformulation, I’ll argue, have been missteps. A number of these different reformulations are incapable of carrying out a central role a truth norm is meant to play, that of explaining justification. The truth norm I’ll defend, however, avoids the implausible results of a prescription to believe all the truths, but doesn’t thereby fail to explain justification. This norm, introduced (but not defended) by Conor McHugh, states that if one has some doxastic attitude about p—i.e. if one believes, disbelieves, or suspends judgement about whether p—then one ought to believe that p if and only if p is true.
Highlights
Consider the following formulation of a truth norm: ought: One ought to believe that p if and only if p is true
I’ll defend the following conditional truth norm, discussed by Conor McHugh: doxastic attitude: If one has some doxastic attitude towards p, one ought to believe that p if and only if p is true. (McHugh 2012, p. 12)
That is the only reformulation of a truth norm that can avoid the implausible aspects of a prescription to believe all and only the truths, but without thereby becoming incapable of explaining justification
Summary
Consider the following formulation of a truth norm: ought: One ought to believe that p if and only if p is true.. According to this kind of explanation, one should follow the norms which, from one’s non-omniscient position, look like the best means of conforming to ought. They might lead to the occasional false but evidentially supported belief Following these subjective norms is supposed to be, according to this explanation, the best means of conforming to ought available to non-omniscient believers like ourselves. Because it explains other epistemic norms, ought—or whatever formulation of a truth norm is defended—is claimed to be the fundamental norm on belief. In response to issues similar to those discussed he says “[t]here may be positive norms for knowledge ... and so positive as well as negative norms for beliefs” (Williamson Forthcoming, p. 13)
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