Abstract
Before the parliamentary elections in 2018, the ruling party in Turkey, AKP, introduced a new apparentement provision in the electoral law, which allowed parties to make electoral alliances in order to meet the electoral threshold. We claim that this was an ex post mistake. AKP’s electoral engineering was motivated by their fear that its coalition partner, MHP, would not exceed the 10% threshold. While MHP actually met the threshold in the election, the opposition party, İP, failed to do so. Thanks to the new law, the votes for İP were not wasted, as would have happened under the old law. AKP less than 50% of seats and it consequently lost the parliamentary majority. Under the old electoral law, AKP would have won the majority. We use four alternative scenarios in order to estimate the seats and evaluate the political consequences of the unsuccessful electoral manipulation
Highlights
While MHP met the threshold in the election, the opposition party, İP, failed to do so
Przy zachowaniu starej ordynacji wszelkie wysiłki zmierzające do zwiększenia liczby głosów na İP spotkałyby się z przeciwdziałaniem rywali
Institutional Choice in New Democracies: Bargaining over Hungary’s 1989 Electoral Law. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 13(2), 153–182
Summary
Wielkie Zgromadzenie Narodowe, i stosuje metodę Jeffersona–D’Hondta do rozdzielenia 600 miejsc w 87 wielomandatowych okręgach. Najbardziej znaczącą cechą systemu wyborczego jest dziesięcioprocentowy próg wprowadzony przez rządy wojskowych po zamachu stanu w 1980 roku, którego celem było zmniejszenie efektywnej liczby partii parlamentarnych (ENPP) do dwóch lub trzech (Özbudun, 1996; Sayarı, 1992)
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
