Abstract
ABSTRACTThis article examines the impact of the NASDAQ’s bid test rule on the information content of short sales surrounding the U.S. Security Exchange Commission introduction of the pilot programme in 2005. It shows that abnormal short selling prior to analyst recommendation changes were very informative when stocks were restricted by the bid test rule. Such informativeness of short selling disappears when the bid test rule was temporarily suspended for pilot stocks. The results are robust after controlling for various factors that may contribute to this anomaly. Both the shorting efficiency hypothesis and the regulatory concern hypothesis are developed to provide explanations for this anomaly. Additional tests show that the regulatory concern is more consistent with the data.
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