Short literature notices

Abstract

What is wrong with thinking of oneself as the owner of one’s body, and with making our bodies available for rent or sale? These are the key questions in Anne Phillips’ book Our bodies. Whose property? Phillips is the Graham Wallas Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and pursues these questions by investigating rape, surrogacy, prostitution, and markets in human cells and organs. She explores similarities and differences in property and market thinking in these fields and investigates whether it is possible to hold a consistent conception of the human body and to find appropriate ways of regulating body work and body parts. Phillips criticizes the claim that we own our bodies and therefore can do what we want with it. She shows how such statements are used both to free from suppression as well as to exploit, and how both proponents and opponents of human body part markets have oversold the property paradigm. That my body belongs to me does not automatically mean that I can sell its parts in a market. Conversely, the transaction of money related to human cells or bodily reproductive services, such as surrogacy, does not necessarily mean an objectification or commodification of human beings. Through an extensive analysis of the human body markets Anne Phillips wants to highlight some of its dangers. In particular, she wants to show how the property paradigm favors mind over body and promotes the emphasis on individual choice, as this turns the focus away from important social issues. Body markets tend to drive out altruistic motives, weaken bonds of reciprocity, or make people less capable of viewing others as equal. I.e., altruism, reciprocity, and equality become subordinate as bodies become resources. Moreover, the property paradigm changes people’s selfconception, their choice sets, and it ‘‘damages the moral fabric of society,’’ Phillips claims. The book explores a variety of meanings of concepts like property, ownership, and transaction. It clarifies the difference between objectification, commodification, and self-ownership. She acknowledges that is too simple to say that ‘‘the body is special,’’ and, therefore, that it cannot be subject to economic transactions. Phillips’ criticism of the property paradigm and her suggested solutions are nevertheless based on a particular conception of the human body: we all have bodies, and in this we are equal. We are united in our common experience of living as embodied beings and in our shared bodily vulnerability. This basic equality is threatened by property and market thinking and makes Phillips opposed to the sale of cells and organs, and against commercial surrogacy. However, she accepts compensation for surrogacy and the donation of gametes. Presumed consent should be used to increase access to organs, she claims. In this book Phillips tries to find an alternative way to the traditional utilitarian, human rights, and ‘‘dignitarian’’ positions. Although her point of departure is partly a feminist position, she is also critical to some of these perspectives. Phillips’ critique of the existing positions is insightful and interesting, and her discussion of the property paradigm is well taken. Her presentation of the alternative, equality and reciprocity through all having bodies, however, is not very elaborate. This book is very relevant P. Kakuk (&) Department of Behavioural Sciences, University of Debrecen, Nagyerdei krt. 98., P.O. Box 45, Debrecen 4032, Hungary e-mail: kakuk.peter@sph.unideb.hu