SHORN-OFF COMPLICITY

Abstract

CRIMINAL complicity has been dramatically changed by the combined decisions of the UK Supreme Court and the Privy Council in Jogee; Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681. At least since the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, it has been settled that a person (S) who has intentionally assisted or encouraged another (P) to commit a crime has been liable to be tried, convicted, and punished as if S was a principal. For decades, there has also been a much-debated, additional form of complicity where the accomplice was “parasitically” liable for further crimes committed by P beyond the scope of a common criminal purpose shared by S and P. For that kind of liability, the accomplice need not have assisted or encouraged the further crime but need only have foreseen that it was a possible incident of the common purpose. The effect of Jogee and Ruddock is that this further form of complicity, first recognised explicitly in the Privy Council decision of Chan Wing-Siu [1985] A.C. 168 and later endorsed by the House of Lords in Powell; English [1999] 1 A.C. 1, has been shorn off the criminal law. As a result, Chan Wing-Siu directions will no longer be given to juries.