Abstract

This paper examines the interstate reconciliation between India and Pakistan after the shock of Sino-Indian War of 1962. The post-1962 war political-security equations, particularly at the regional level, gave rise to a situation that necessitated India’s reconciliatory negotiations with Pakistan over Kashmir. Though the rival parties engaged in a six-round political dialogue, the process ended up in a deadlock followed by spirals of armed clashes that culminated in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. The paper shows that this reconciliation process proved counterproductive because it was imposed from outside and the principal parties, in a window-driven haste and under the political-strategic constraints, could not mutually agree on to reconcile their political differences and settle the territorial dispute over Kashmir.

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