Shirking When Bureaucratic Accountability Is Due? Evidence from Managing Severe Safety Accidents

Abstract

When bureaucrats are up to answer for governance accidents, shirking could be a “less harm” strategy to ward off bureaucratic accountability. This study searches for evidence of shirking behaviors and investigates shirking strategies. Modeled as a latent phenomenon, shirking is context specific, enabled and constrained by power and institutional opportunities. Examining the whole population of 213 severe safety accidents in China between 2012 and 2018, the findings confirm that more powerful provincial leaders reduce the number of accountable bureaucrats and those with longer tenure suppress judicial prosecutions. Externally appointed leaders shift sanctions downward to lower-level subordinates once securing longer tenure. Higher-up political attention demands more top-down accountability; nevertheless, bureaucrats may nudge political attention to mitigate responsibilities. Due to bureaucrats’ shirking, safety accidents may not receive accountability commensurate with accident severity.