Shirking the Briggs Plan: Civilian Resistance to Reform and the Army’s Struggle for Control in Malaya, 1950–1952

Abstract

ABSTRACT Civil–military tensions played a central role shaping the evolution of the British campaign during the Malayan Emergency. While the Briggs Plan has often been described as focusing exclusively on population control, Briggs developed a strategy combining coercive and security measures with wide-reaching administrative and political reforms. However, the reluctance of top members of the Malayan Civil Service to risk a political confrontation with Malay elites, who were deeply opposed to investment and the extension of political rights to the Chinese squatters, led them to resist the political elements of the programme during Briggs’ tenure as director of operations (June 1950-November 1951). Briggs’ lack of executive authority over the civil service, combined with conservative political preferences and the slow pace of administrative and government reform, led to the manifestation of the Briggs Plan as a programme of coercive population control. From mid-1951, the civil–military struggle over campaign strategy transformed into a struggle for control of the Malayan government. The new Conservative government’s decision to appoint General Templer high commissioner in late 1951 represented a victory for the officers, over civilian resistance. At the same time, singularly crediting Templer overlooks important political successes achieved by Briggs and Templer’s predecessor, High Commissioner Gurney.