Abstract
Although local electoral accountability should be stronger when responsibilities are clearly assigned to local governments, the involvement of higher tiers of government is often associated with policies specifically designed to improve local accountability. This article investigates the impact of centralization on local electoral accountability in the context of California's school finance system. Results show that voters are responsive to differences in dropout rates and pupil–teacher ratios, at least in some contexts, and that local electoral accountability is affected by a district's degree of centralization. Dropout rate regressions reveal that the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 appears to have sharpened local electoral accountability.
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