Sharing in the commons: Evaluating the pooling system in a Danish seine fishery in Japan

Abstract

This paper examines an extreme voluntary cooperation institution called ‘pooling system’ which is designed to manage the Danish seine fishery in the Muroran region, Hokkaido, Japan. This institution requires all vessels to fish together and to share the revenue. This paper examines the historical context in which this unique management was established, details of current management practices, and their impact on the ex-vessel price and productivity of the fishery. Using a difference-in-differences design, we show that the pooling system raised the price of walleye pollock (Gadus chalcogrammus), the main target species, by around 24%, while it also raised the total landings per net by around 25%. The price increase is likely due to quality improvement, while the productivity increase is likely due to improved spatial allocation of fishing efforts. We argue that the existence of this unique management system for more than two decades is largely due to these large economic benefits. In addition, the small number of vessels and owners has played a major role in facilitating consensus building and discouraging shirking. Finally, the existence of a skipper with strong leadership was fundamental to the establishment of this system.