Shareholding of Large Blockholders and Firm Litigation Risks: An Empirical Study Based on Chinese Listed Companies

Abstract

Firms' engagement in litigation is an unusual incident which might incur not only serious financial losses but also several problems such as damage of firm reputation, losses of customers and the difficulty in future financing. Therefore, the research of the factors influencing firm litigation risks has great significance. Based on the literature of corporate governance, this paper takes the A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014 as the initial sample, and employs propensity score matching method to analyze the effect of the shareholding of large blockholders on firm litigation risks. It comes to the conclusions as follows:firstly, with the increase in the shareholding proportion of the first largest blockholder, firm litigation risks significantly reduce; secondly, with the rise in firm visibility, the role of large blockholders in the reduction in firm litigation risks weakens, that is to say, compared with firms with higher visibility, the role of large blockholders in the reduction in firm litigation risks is stronger in firms with lower visibility; thirdly, compared with companies with blockholder counterbalance, the role of large blockholders in the reduction in firm litigation risks is stronger in companies without blockholder counterbalance. It not only deepens the research of the factors influencing firm litigation risks, but also further extends the role of large blockholders in corporate governance and risk control; and it is of great significance to the understanding of the role of large blockholders in the prevention of firm litigation risks.