Abstract
Suppose a team facing a symmetric payoff function can choose an information structure and a rule of action for each of the team members and, then, each of the team members has to make observations and take actions without the possibility of communicating with the others. In the footsteps of Cremer (1990), the question is asked whether the information structure should be the same for each member (shared knowledge) or should vary across members (diversified knowledge). It is shown that a team facing a supermodular payoff function should choose shared knowledge while a team facing a submodular payoff function should choose diversified knowledge.J. Japan. Int. Econ., June 1996,10(2), pp. 181–195. Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, California.
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