Abstract
The paper develops a new explanation of sharecropping based on the idea of an incentive equilibrium. It considers a set-up in which a few landlords in a village confront the choice of cultivating their farms by adopting different tenurial arrangements, ranging from owner operation, through the fixed-rental system to sharecropping. These landlords are the only sources of employment in the village, and compete in the wages they pay to their workers. In such an environment sharecropping is explained as a form of strategic delegation where a landlord gets extra benefit by having a share tenant and giving him suitable incentives.
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