Abstract
We consider multiplayer social dilemma games played in a large population. The members of the population interact in randomly formed coalitions. Each coalition generates a social wealth (value), which is distributed among the coalition members according to their Shapley values. Evolution of the whole population is governed by the replicator equation. We demonstrate that application of the Shapley value fosters the time asymptotic cooperation in populations for various types of multiplayer social dilemmas.
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