Shame and Honor: Aristotle’s Thumos as a Basic Desire

Abstract

AbstractOne of three basic types of desire, claims Aristotle, isthumos(‘spirit,’ ‘passion,’ ‘heart,’ ‘anger,’ ‘impulse’). The other two areepithumia(‘appetite’) andboulêsis(‘wish,’ ‘rational desire’). Yet, he never gives us an account ofthumos; it has also received relatively little scholarly attention. I argue thatthumoshas two key features. First, it is able to cognize what I call ‘social value,’ the agent’s own perceived standing relative to others in a certain domain. In human animals, shame and honor are especially important manifestations of social value. Second,thumosprovides non-rational motivation to pursue what affirms the agent’s social value and avoid what denies it. Interpretations that holdthumosjust is anger, or that its object is the fine (kalon), I argue, are mistaken. My account also explains the role ofthumosin moral education. In a virtuous agentthumoswill be affectively attuned to the correct social rankings; it will take the practically wise, the lovers of the fine, or moral exemplars, as authorities.