Abstract
AbstractOne of three basic types of desire, claims Aristotle, isthumos(‘spirit,’ ‘passion,’ ‘heart,’ ‘anger,’ ‘impulse’). The other two areepithumia(‘appetite’) andboulêsis(‘wish,’ ‘rational desire’). Yet, he never gives us an account ofthumos; it has also received relatively little scholarly attention. I argue thatthumoshas two key features. First, it is able to cognize what I call ‘social value,’ the agent’s own perceived standing relative to others in a certain domain. In human animals, shame and honor are especially important manifestations of social value. Second,thumosprovides non-rational motivation to pursue what affirms the agent’s social value and avoid what denies it. Interpretations that holdthumosjust is anger, or that its object is the fine (kalon), I argue, are mistaken. My account also explains the role ofthumosin moral education. In a virtuous agentthumoswill be affectively attuned to the correct social rankings; it will take the practically wise, the lovers of the fine, or moral exemplars, as authorities.
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