Abstract

This paper analyzes the apparently emerging phenomenon of private regulation through ad hoc online coalitions. It evaluates the online cost structures that permit and shape the collective action underlying this phenomenon. It also evaluates the motivations and capacity necessary in particular circumstances to inspire such regulation. The paper concludes that a necessary motivation is the perception of both a market and a government failure, and the necessary capacity is essentially a function of willing participants. As this paper's primary case study targeted speech, many of the paper's conclusions are particularly relevant for future instances of private speech regulation. As a result, the paper addresses some normative implications of campaigns aimed at private speech. The primary case study centers on the online coalition that coalesced and dissolved around the acts of Sinclair Broadcasting Group less than a month before the 2004 presidential election. The onling campaign attempted to punish a private party; other campaigns in the following weeks attempted to aid other private parties. All such campaigns will become more common. This paper attempts a first analysis of their mechanisms, possible effects, and implications.

Highlights

  • Less than a month before the 2004 presidential election, newspapers reported that Sinclair Broadcasting Group would require its 62 broadcast stations to air Stolen Honor, a documentary attacking Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry

  • Steve Soto observed that online costs permitted new activism to counter the stunt, even if the government would not. He suggested challenging Sinclair's license renewals to burden Sinclair with lawyer fees though he said he had "no illusions that the FCC and Michael Powell [the Republican-appointed and -FCC Chairman] may reject some Sinclair licenses over this." He believed the costs of opposing Sinclair were manageable because the internet had reduced transaction and organizational costs: Sinclair assumes that [license-challenges] would not happen because a national campaign opposing a major media conglomerate would cost [Sinclair] opponents way too much

  • Executives and editors usually can modify the speech of journalists;[3 68] an executive of a conglomerate like General Electric can determine by law who speaks through the assets of NBC, which GE owns

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

Less than a month before the 2004 presidential election, newspapers reported that Sinclair Broadcasting Group would require its 62 broadcast stations to air Stolen Honor, a documentary attacking Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry. With Sinclair, the participants used some existing private regulatory tools, like an advertiser boycott, to perform an existing activity, private regulation, the internet transformed the use and nature of these tools and the activity It did so by lowering the costs of organization to permit unaffiliated volunteers to perform actions that usually had required some level of government-or at least a centralized authority or preexisting institution of some sort. Companies, 6 car companies seen as too gay-friendly,[7] professors considered ultraliberal by conservatives,' and companies based on party affiliation.[9] Other campaigns aimed not to deter but to subsidize; they allocated specific products to chosen groups (like soldiers) based on social policy.'° This ad hoc, flash regulation can be as powerful and effective as established nongovernmental and governmental bodies in enacting reforms and can potentially support far more active participation It will transform political action by enabling powerful new collective actions, even those based on diffuse harms. U.S Families of Dead Raise 600,000 Dollars for Fallujah Refugees, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 24, 2004, availableat http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/122504Y.shtml; posting of Richard Gassan to Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/12/23/64551/ 725 (Dec. 23, 2004, 04:45 PDT)

CASE STUDY
Sinclair
Makers of Stolen Honor
Blog Communities
27. Clay Shirky
Other Liberal Organizations
The PerceivedBackground:FCC andMainstreamMedia
The Story Breaks
The Blogstorm Begins
69. One commentator suggests
Challenging Licenses
Boycotting Advertisers
Circulating Petitions
Spreading Other Embarrassing Information
Filing Lawsuits
Other Actions-Taken or Proposed
Victory
Dissolution
WHAT KIND OF PRIVATE REGULATION?
Acting Self-Consciously as Regulators
Nature of the Firm-Neither Market nor Hierarchy
Problem of Social Cost-Neither Government nor Bargaining
Collective Action Problems and Blogstorm Organizational Structure
Ad Hoc Collaboration
Cost-Structure
Sufficient Motivation and Capacity
Towards a Better Blogstorm
Labor-Benefits of Increased Capacity
Message-How to Get More Participants
NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Through Government Allocation of Speech Rights
Through Advertising
The IncreasingLikelihoodof PrivateRegulation
Non-Media-RelatedInternet-EnabledRegulation
Findings
CONCLUSION
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