Abstract
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) such as Intel SGX are becoming a commonplace for the security in server processors. Intel SGX provides the guarantees of confidentiality, integrity and replay attack protection for a specific region of memory. However, the downside of it is the performance bottleneck due to the context switching overhead and the page faults for the larger memory footprint applications. In this paper, we propose a scheme <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">SGXFault</i> which ensures for major part of the execution, the pages are available in the secure memory when needed. We do this decision at the last level cache (LLC) by locking the blocks of the frequent pages to the LLC using Cache Lockdown mechanism. In addition to this, we do a page-level prediction based prefetching when there is a miss in the LLC. Using the combination of both the approaches, we are able to outperform baseline Intel SGX and recent competing scheme by around 18.6% and 17.8% respectively.
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