Abstract
Paul J. Weithman’s argument is a constitutional one.1 Agreeing with many liberals that the state may not enforce controversial conceptions of the meaning of life on citizens who disagree, he nevertheless believes that the state may legitimately forbid physician-assisted dying. This is because there is another ground for such a ban. There are legitimate reasons for an absolute prohibition on physicians’ ever intending the death of their patients. ‘‘The reasons that doctors should hold themselves to a prohibition on intentionally causing their patients’ deaths are quite similar to the reasons that doctors should hold themselves to an absolute prohibition on seducing them’’ (p. 554). This is an argument from analogy, and I shall argue that the two kinds of cases are sufficiently different in character that the argument fails. The case that Weithman takes to be a settled matter is the absolute prohibition on physicians’ intending to seduce their patients. He presents what seems to me a completely successful argument. To show that an absolute prohibition on physicians’ intending the death of their patients is required he must show that the features which explain the former prohibition hold (or at least enough of them hold) in the case of the latter prohibition.
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