Seven Points for a Reconstruction Labor Policy

Abstract

Now, apparently, we are as little prepared for an orderly return to peace as we were for war. Here again the possibility of such a changed condition has been evident for not much more than two months. The new feature in the past war was that victory required not only a fighting force with high morale, but an industrial force behind the line with an equally high morale and unlimited raw materials. In order to keep a well-equipped and well-fed army of two million men in Europe, it was necessary to have an organization of twelve to fifteen million men in war industries and transportation. Just as an army cannot fight in the field without thorough organization, an industrial army cannot produce the necessary supplies without organization. It has been our pride that our government has not attempted to control or direct our industrial activities. It was no small task, therefore, to organize and of necessity, centralize control of the industrial life of one hundred million people accustomed to regulate their own affairs individually. The mere size of the country with widely varying conditions made the task seem almost impossible of accomplishment. The longer the war continued, the more apparent became the necessity for control and centralization, and like other countries we learned that business as usual was just as impossible as live as usual or think as usual. Even after a year and eight months our industrial war machinery is not sufficiently complete in its control to prevent an excessive labor turnover, and consequently inefficient production. It is only necessary to mention a few of the various agencies by means of which the government has exercised control and centralized responsibility, to realize how far we have travelled from