Service outsourcing contract design under asymmetric information

Abstract

PurposeUpstream suppliers attempt to outsource product after-sales services to midstream third-party service providers while selling the product directly to downstream sellers, forming a networked supply chain. However, a problem of information asymmetry in the market demand among supply chain members exists. The authors investigate the impact of demand information asymmetry among third-party service providers, upstream suppliers and downstream sellers in the supply chain on the supplier's contract selection under the networked framework.Design/methodology/approachThe authors establish a model in which the supplier can use a wholesale price contract and facilitate a signaling game between the third-party service provider and the seller. Conversely, the supplier could use a menu contract to establish an incentive mechanism to solve information asymmetry. The authors propose heuristic algorithms to quickly estimate a supplier's optimal profit.FindingsThe results show that when the demand forecasting bias is relatively small, the use of a menu contract by the supplier could eliminate information asymmetry; when the demand forecasting bias is large enough, the signaling mechanism between the third-party service provider and the seller could alleviate the double marginalization effect in the supply chain. Although it is common to solve the asymmetric information problem by establishing incentive mechanisms, the authors found that in the latter case, the supplier is better off when no incentive mechanisms are implemented in the networked supply chain.Originality/valueThis study compares screening and signaling effects and compares firms' profits in both cases.