Abstract
This paper contributes to the theory of rational choice under sequential criteria. Following the approach initiated by Manzini and Mariotti (2007) for single-valued choice functions, we characterize choice correspondences that are rational by two sequential criteria under a mild consistency axiom. Rationales ensuring the sequential rationalization are explicitly constructed and a uniquely determined, canonical solution is provided.
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