Sequential or Simultaneous Elections? A Welfare Analysis

Abstract

This paper contributes to a debate over a key question in the design of electoral systems. Should all voters go to the polling booth on the same day or should elections be staggered, with late voters observing the choices of early voters before making their decisions? Using a model of voting and social learning, we identify a key trade-obetween simultaneous and sequential elections. In particular, sequential election systems place too much weight on the preferences and information of early states but also provide late voters with information that is valuable in terms of selecting high quality candidates. Under simultaneous elections, voters equally weigh the available information but place too little weight on the information in aggregate and thus place too much weight on their priors. Given this trade-o�, either sequential or simultaneous elections might be welfare- preferred. We provide a quantitative evaluation of this trade-obased upon an application to the 2004 presidential primary. The results suggest that simultaneous systems outperform sequential systems although the dierence in welfare is relatively small.