Abstract
ABSTRACT In this article we take a longitudinal view on presidential-term-limit reforms in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa since the third wave of democratization. Many countries in the two regions (re-)introduced term limits at this time as a democratic safeguard against personal rule and power abuses. Since then, term limits have been contested by a plethora of reform attempts. Such reforms are commonly seen as a risk to democracy since stable institutions are considered essential for democratic consolidation, while term-limit eliminations are associated with processes of autocratization. From the literature on democratic consolidation, institutionalization and presidential-term-limit reforms we distil theoretical expectations on term-limit-reform paths across time and examine how they relate to the evolution of the political regime. To empirically investigate reform paths across regions we apply the research method of sequence analysis. We find that the stability of term-limit rules is more prevalent than expected, but that this stability sometimes masks institutional ineffectiveness under authoritarian regimes. Rule instability induced by frequent reforms can be part of a piecemeal path towards autocratization, but it can also reflect an open-ended tug of war between authoritarian tendencies and democratic resistance.
Highlights
At the beginning of the third wave of democratization many countries around the globe adopted or resumed presidential term limits in their constitutions
The proximity between these different strands of thought is reflected in the concept of the “institutionalization of power”12 that is prominent in the study of term limits in sub-Saharan Africa
We found six clusters of reform paths; we discuss here in which respects they differ from those we had identified in the literature, and what they teach us about the institutionalization of term-limit rules in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa
Summary
In the literature on institutionalization and democratic consolidation, the stability of rules is closely linked to constitutionalism, the rule of law and to horizontal constraints on leaders, all positing the idea that the state and powerholders respect the primacy of the constitution.11 The proximity between these different strands of thought is reflected in the concept of the “institutionalization of power” that is prominent in the study of term limits in sub-Saharan Africa. We found six clusters of reform paths (see Figure 2 below); we discuss here in which respects they differ from those we had identified in the literature, and what they teach us about the institutionalization of term-limit rules in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa.. There are more subSaharan African than Latin American cases in the sample, and an even
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