Separate Methodological Problems of the Evolution of Guilt in Civil Law

Abstract

The paper notes that in ancient societies, the responsibility did not start with guilt, but rather with infliction of harm, when harm or losses were compensated to victims (creditors) only in connection with this infliction, the debtor’s mental attitude to his actions was not taken into account. Guilt as a mental attitude of the subject to their illegal action (inaction) and the ensuing consequences appeared in connection with the formation of an individualistic worldview in society. From this period on, responsibility begins to be based on the principles of guilt. There is a gradual overcoming of fundamentals of the infliction of harm. Subsequently, the ideas of individualism began to lose their appeal to society and the process of transition from individualism to collectivism began. In matters of responsibility this was reflected in the emergence of strict liability, when compensation for losses (harm) was carried out not in connection with the establishment of a certain mental attitude of the subject to their illegal behavior, but for the very fact of causing harm or losses. Currently, in the science of civil law, there is no longer that urgency in the discussion about the principles of responsibility: both the fundamentals of guilt and the fundamentals of infliction of harm are recognized by legislation and judicial practice. It can be argued that the fundamentals of infliction of harm will be recognized in even greater volumes. In particular, from such positions, apparently, it is necessary to resolve the issue of compensation for damage to the victim caused by an object controlled by artificial intelligence, it will not even be strict, as the responsibility of the owner of the source of increased danger, but general (absolute) liability for the very fact of causing harm.