SENTIMENTALISMO ENATIVO AVALIATIVO

Abstract

ABSTRACT I argue for a version of evaluative sentimentalism according to which (i) affective responses are appearances of value and (ii) value judgments can repudiate or assent to these appearances. The starting point of my argument is Giovanna Colombetti’s enactive conception of affectivity. According to Colombetti, an affective being is one that through its sense-making activity enacts meaningful value-laden distinctions and, thus, brings forth an Umwelt (i.e., an environment that has a specific significance for it). The elements of that Umwelt strike the affective being as meaningful or valuable and to be thus struck is to be affected by those things. In that sense, affective responses can be characterized as appearances of value. I hold that appearances of value are best understood as perceptions of affordances. This view has consequences for our understanding of value judgments. The evaluative concepts that are relevant to us must map onto distinctions that are meaningful to us. As such, relevant evaluative concepts must capture the significance of the elements in the Umwelt that affect the organism. The upshot is that the significance value judgments ascribe to their objects can coincide with the meaning with which the object is presented to us in an affective response.