Abstract
AbstractAnderson suggests that theories of sensorimotor grounding are too narrow to account for his findings of widespread “reuse” supporting multiple different cognitive “task domains.” I call some of the methodological assumptions underlying this conclusion into question, and suggest that his examples reaffirm rather than undermine the special status of sensorimotor processes in cognitive evolution.
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