Abstract
A recently proposed navigation methodology for aerial platforms based on the vehicle dynamic model (VDM) has shown promising results in terms of navigation autonomy. Its practical realization requires that control inputs are related to the same absolute time frame as inertial measurement unit (IMU) data and all other observations when available (e.g., global navigation satellite system (GNSS) position, barometric altitude, etc.). This study analyzes the (non-) tolerances of possible delays in control-input command with respect to navigation performance on a fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Multiple simulations using two emulated trajectories based on real flights reveal the vital importance of correct time-tagging of servo data while that of motor data turned out to be tolerable to a considerably large extent.
Highlights
Inertial navigation system/global navigation satellite system (INS/GNSS) integration is currently the dominant navigation system used to provide satisfactory short-term and long-term accuracy for unmanned aerial robots
Problems emerge when outage occurs in GNSS signal reception, which can happen as a result of loss of line of sight with satellites, by suffering interference caused by nearby high-power transmitters or by the electronics on board the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) itself, or because of spoofing or intentional jamming
As this study aims to assess the effects of time-tagging errors in the control input only, emulated sensor readings were introduced to avoid mixing the effects with additional errors
Summary
Inertial navigation system/global navigation satellite system (INS/GNSS) integration is currently the dominant navigation system used to provide satisfactory short-term and long-term accuracy for unmanned aerial robots. Problems emerge when outage occurs in GNSS signal reception, which can happen as a result of loss of line of sight with satellites, by suffering interference caused by nearby high-power transmitters or by the electronics on board the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) itself, or because of spoofing or intentional jamming. In this situation, the GNSS measurements become either untrustworthy or unavailable and the navigation solution is based only on INS in a dead-reckoning fashion. The control input can be provided by different sources, such as the autopilot or the microcontrollers commanding the servos, depending on the architecture of the platform
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