Abstract

Korea has designed a Helium-Cooled Ceramic Reflector (HCCR)-based Test Blanket System (TBS) for International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). Among seven selected reference accidents in Korean TBS, in-box loss of coolant accident (LOCA) is one of them. This is initiated by a double-ended break of the coolant pipe in the Breeding Zone (BZ), pressurizing the BZ box structure, causing pressurization of the Tritium Extraction System (TES) and purging of pipelines. When the accident is detected, the Plant Safety System (PSS) isolates the Helium Cooling System (HCS) and TES, and requests plasma shutdown to Fusion Power Shutdown System (FPSS). To prevent aggravating failure of the system, the safety function is automatically activated when the accident is detected, the device being the isolation valve of HCS and TES. One important observation of this accident is that instant isolation is not a good measure to take. In terms of the possibility of aggravating failure, system isolation is an important safety procedure but isolated TES volume is exposed to high pressure and temperature conditions in the early move of the accident transient. The result of system safety analysis shows that delayed isolation keeps the system safe for a while. In this article, given the preliminary accident analysis results for the current HCCR TBS, case studies were performed regarding the delayed isolation timing effect. For this transient simulation, Korean nuclear fusion reactor safety analysis code (GAMMA-FR) was used.

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